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We all agree on the common stance that no one in any industry desires the occurrence of 
an accident. This belief is a common premise no matter what respective industry one may work 
in or for. A serious fire, a permanent injury, toxic release or the fatality of an employee or owner 
can cause the loss of profit, reputation or even an entire business. Even if you are not a facility or 
small company that manages Highly Hazardous Chemicals and happen to fall under the OSHA 
Process Safety Management or EPA Risk Management Program, you still want to prevent such 
losses. One may not have a major budget to implement extravagantly structured safety, health 
and compliance management systems that may bring success but are very expensive to maintain 
for smaller or midsize facilities. [3] You do, however, need to understand your risks and apply 
recognized EHS measures to mitigate and manage those risks. 
 
The OSHA PSM regulatory standard prescribes fourteen explicit elements that are required to be 
in place for manufacturing facilities that fall under the standard. To many smaller or mid-sized, 
moderately regulated (or non-regulated) manufacturing sites, OSHAs PSM standard might not be 
a logical or realistic fit unless you are in a facility that works with or around highly hazardous 
chemicals (HHCs) [5]. However, it would be a very tremendous mistake to think that there are 
no parts of the OSHA PSM standard or guideline that do not apply to these in some way, shape 
or form. In addition, many if not most, of the activities performed by maintenance, construction 
and engineering groups at small non-regulated or non-chemical facilities are governed and 
regulated by the same industry codes and standards required for larger OSHA PSM facilities. 
The only real difference may be in the level and degree of risk, documentation and resources 
required to maintain the programs. However, in the eyes of this presenter, it wouldn’t be a bad 
practice to document your activities as if you were under the watchful eyes of OSHA through a 
PSM program [6]. 
Introduction 
OSHA’s PSM standard covers the management of Hazards associated with Highly 
Hazardous Chemicals (HHC) and established requirements for an integrated and comprehensive 
management program that involves technologies and management practices.  There is a likely 
possibility that even though some of the facilities in your company are not subject to the OSHA 
PSM standard, you are required to follow an industry, national code or consensus standard in 
addition to some international quality initiative (RCMS, ISO). It is also important to state that 
even though not all your facilities fall under the OSHA PSM Standard, your facilities will be 
expected to employ and maintain a minimum standard of care and utilize best practices within 
the industry (i.e. RAGAGEP) [6]. Some examples of such standards, codes and practices include 
API, ASME and NFPA. All of which require extensive and ‘auditable’ documentation. Many 
organizations have instituted customized integrated PSM Lite Management Programs for Process 
Safety.  
 In summary, through the combination of demonstrated experiences within industry, 
recent OSHA inspections, industry publication and learnings from Major Process Safety 
Incidents, there are at least five primary Process Safety Management elements and four 
fundamental Process Safety Pillars that are essential to even non- OSHA PSM sites. [6][3]. For 
the sake of this abstract the focus of this topic will be toward non-PSM and/or non-chemical 












Ammonium Nitrate explosion 
in West Texas in April 2013. 






Phnolic Resin Dust 
Explosions and fire at a 
hazardous waste facility forced 
the evacuation of 
approximately 16,000 residents 
from Apex, North Carolina, on 
October 5, 2006. 
Dust, Ammonium 
Nitrate, Sugar and 
Hazardous Waste 
Incidents, what do 
these incidents have 
in common ? 
Answer: They were 
Not PSM Facilities 
but had no (or 
lacking) essential 
Safety Management 
Systems and a 
deficient safety 
culture [3, CSB] 
Sugar dust explosion--
Imperial Sugar Plant - 
Savannah GA 
(Feb. 2008) 
• 14 workers killed 
Facility Destroyed 
Figure 1: Major Process 
Safety Incidents at Non-
Chemical or Non PSM 
Facilities. [14,CSB] 
Overview: 
As stated earlier, the type, structure, or size of any industrial facility within your 
organization makes no difference. We all agree that major process accidents are not acceptable. 
If we look at how these major accidents occur, it is often the usual norm for these events to 
encompass multiple contributing causes and a small number of root causes. In most cases, it 
involves a chain of events triggered by some initiating event or a series of process failures and/or 
systems with gaps and holes aligned at the wrong moment (i.e. Swiss Cheese). 
 
In other words, something goes wrong somewhere, equipment or system failure, 
management system failure and/or a human error which leads to an unacceptable catastrophic 
event (i.e. explosion, toxic release). These types of accidents are typically synonymous with the 
Petrochemical or Oil and Gas Industries since these industries consist of larger facilities and are 
typically governed by the OSHA PSM Standard.  
However, as statistics indicate, these major incidents occur in other industries such as the 
food, Pharmaceutical, Hazardous Waste and Agriculture facilities as evidenced in Figure 1. For 
instance, the CSB (Chemical Safety Board) identified 281 combustible dust incidents in the US 
between 1980 and 2005 that killed 119 workers and injured 718, and extensively damaged 
industrial facilities [3] [CSB]. These facilities typically have relatively smaller manufacturing 
facilities as compared, on average, to the Petrochemical or Oil & Gas Facilities. In addition, 
there is no explicit or specific requirement for these facilities to implement an OSHA PSM 
program and in some instances, there is no comprehensive federal OSHA standard aimed at 
controlling the risk of catastrophic events (i.e. explosions) in these types of general industries 
(i.e. Dusts).  
Are these Statistics Acceptable? [3] 
– Over the last 20-30 years (Average) 
 Ammonia Releases:          60 per year 
 Dust Explosions:               10 per year 
 Pharmaceutical Explosions 10-15 per year  
 
As we stated numerous times, we stand on the common ground in that catastrophic events in 
any industry are not acceptable however, what is the remedy? The next two important questions 
on the table for this presenter are: Is a full Process Safety Management (PSM) program the 
answer for non-Chemical and/or non-PSM facilities? Is Regulatory Compliance enough?  
 
Professionals and Professional Organizations alike will attest to the fact that PSM may not be 
fully understood or digestible by most “non-chemical” manufacturers. For instance, such 
statements as; a) “We make food, not chemicals”, “We don’t have highly hazardous chemicals 
on site”, c) “We are a Waste facility and we comply with EPA Guidelines” or d) “Ammonium 
Nitrate is not listed as a PSM Chemical” come to mind [1][3][7]. We first begin with focusing on 
the challenges and barriers in place for these organizations. 
 
 
Obstacles and Challenges for Small and Non-PSM facilities: 
   
Limited Resources 
The implementation of the full spectrum of requirements from the Process Safety 
Management (PSM) to small or mid-size facilities requires significantly more organizational 
energy and resources from a smaller pool of individuals. This can substantially overwhelm the 
existing and available resources of a small or mid-sized chemical plant or other small business 
that utilizes chemicals in smaller quantities. Small, and in many cases, mid-sized organizations 
do not have the technological expertise and manpower resources of larger organizations which 
limits their ability to implement a complete and effective PSM Program [3][4] especially when 
there may be no requirement to implement such an enormous program. 
 
Sustainability, Value and Miss-match  
Since many smaller or mid-sized non-PSM or non-chemical facilities do not always have 
the know-how, information or resources needed to develop and implement a Process Safety 
Management program, many organizations reach out to external resources. Many of these 
organizations attempted to implement a safety and health program (i.e. PSM like programs) by 
asking for suggestions on program techniques and procedure from the government agencies (i.e. 
OSHA VPP or voluntary compliance assistance programs) or from other larger companies (i.e. 
DuPont). In a lot instances, these programs were eventually unsuccessful and unsustainable 
because they: a) Were not suited for the structure, resources and size of the organization or b) 
they were not based on or did not truly address the true risks of the smaller and/or non-chemical 
facilities. [3][4]. Even with resources to outsource expertise, most small and mid-sized facilities 
have had difficulty in demonstrating the value of a full PSM program in their operations 
especially where regulatory requirements can be hazy and vague. These facilities are reluctant, 
and simply not able to maintain such programs from an organizational standpoint. Solutions 
should be aimed towards a customization and integration of: a) practical written Safety 
Management Program and standards tailored and pertinent to their organization or facility, b) 
healthy organizational safety culture, and c) programs and systems based on plausible risks and 
hazards to a specific organization, instead of trying to force fit a standardized large scale and/or 
expensive program. [3] to these smaller non-PSM and/or non-chemical facilities. 
 
Potential Solution:  
In fact, for small or mid-sized facilities and organizations, including non-chemical industrial 
entities, this presenter suggests a Risk Based PSM Lite approach. Based on documented shared 
experiences, major industry accidents, demonstrated industry success and industry research and 
publication, there are four (4) key fundamental (philosophical) pillars of a Risk Based Process 
Safety Management Program [2] and five of the OSHA PSM Elements that are essential for any 
healthy Process Safety Management System no matter what industry or no matter the size of the 
facility. Now with increased size, industry type and complexity of the facility these basic 
requirements increase and become more intricate without question. However, for the sake of this 
abstract, I will focus on the core basic requirements for smaller and/or non-chemical facilities.  
This also does not absolve any facility from basic regulatory compliance requirements (i.e. 
Hazard Communication, Environmental). 
 
 
Four (4) key fundamental Pillars of a Safety Management Program: 
The premise of the RBPS approach is for organizations, regardless of size or industry, to build 
and operate a more effective process safety management system (risk-based) that is custom-fit 
for their organization. (CCPS) [2]. 
1. Leadership Commitment and Culture: No matter the organization, leadership sets the 
organizational tone. If one can identify one successful organization, I can show great 
leadership. The safest companies have leaders that truly understand the concept of 
ssafety. As stated in the book “Guidelines for Risk-Based Safety”; ‘Effective safety 
leaders share common practices such as vision, credibility, communication, collaboration, 
feedback, action orientation and accountability. What leaders demonstrate, emphasize 
and reinforce determines how people respond to events, how they make decisions and 
whether they carry out the organization’s objectives’.  Once the organization truly 
believes in the leadership commitment, there is complete buy-in throughout the 
organization. There is no substitute for Management Commitment to safety in any 
organization. [6] 
2.  Hazard Recognition, Evaluation, and Control:  
When asked, most people on the street would say is this is what a safety program is all 
about. This involves proactive hazard recognition in terms of environment (the 
surroundings of the workers), the people doing the work, equipment/materials used in the 
work process, and processes/practices themselves. As eloquently stated, ‘Organizations 
that understand hazards and risk are better able to allocate limited resources in the most 





Small Non PSM Chemical Company: Concept Sciences wanted to be 
the first (and only) company to produce Hydroxylamine Freebase in the 
United States.  The freebase is formed by removing the salt with an acid 
to leave the simple hydroxylamine.  This compound is very unstable.  On 
February 19, 1999 during the very first batch the employees lost control 
of the process. The employees had no knowledge of the dangers of this 
compound, so they continued trying to regain control of the process.  
Within minutes, the material decomposed explosively leaving 5 dead, 13 
injured and a 30-foot diameter crater in the ground.   
Small Non PSM Company:  At 1:33 pm on December 19, 2007, an 
explosion and fire destroyed T2 Laboratories, Inc. (T2), a very small 
chemical manufacturer on the north side of Jacksonville, Florida. The 
explosion, which was felt and heard 15 miles away in downtown 
Jacksonville, killed four T2 employees, including a co-owner. It injured 
32, including four T2 employees and 28 members of the public at 
surrounding businesses. Among other factors, the employees had no 
knowledge of the dangers of this compound 
Examples and results of small 
organizations not understanding Risks 
3. Documented and Effective Management Systems:  
This means a structure and system that is specifically constructed for your organization 
that captures, in writing, processes by which the organization accomplishes safety and 
health such as the following [2] [18] 
a) manages the process within safe limits and manages change effectively 
b) maintains the integrity of the processes and equipment   
c) Conducts Investigation and Root Cause analyses 
d) Identification and Management of Hazards (i.e. exposures, emergencies, fires 
etc.) 
 
4. Learning from experience 
‘Involves proactive measures such as monitoring, auditing, metrics, education, training 
and acting on internal and external sources of information’. [2] This pillar is about taking 
best practices, lessons learned from incidents, training audits, metrics and converting 












   
 
 
These Four Fundamental Pillars are applicable to any Small Non-PSM or Non-
Chemical facility in Multiple of Industries 
Small Non-PSM Chemical Plant  Small Dust Handling Facility  






The RBPS strategic approach, as stated in the Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, is 
founded on the principle that the organization examines its risks to the full understanding of the 
organization and captures these risks in documentation, training and programs. The 
implementation of practices and measures to manage and mitigate these risks are fundamentally 
based on: [2]  
􀁸 Process Knowledge and the level and degree of risk 
􀁸 Resources available vs resources required (practical approach) and address the gaps 
􀁸 The safety culture and tone of the organization, what is required, what brings value and 
what is missing 
  
Figure 2: Pillars (Foundational Blocks) and associated Elements 
that constitute sound Safety Management System [2] 
WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR PSM LITE? 
 We must reiterate and completely understand that the Pillars mentioned above serve as 
the foundation for any Health Process Safety Management program regardless of size. There are 
still essential elements that must be in place to support and exemplify the fundamental pillars of 
a successful Process Safety Management Program. However smaller, mid-sized and/or non-
chemical facilities may have a large amount of work and responsibilities distributed over a 
smaller mass of individuals. This structure often presents significant challenges and difficulties 
in the implementation of any comprehensive Process Safety Management programs. There are 
just simply not enough hours in a day and not enough people to handle the plans, procedures, 
assessments and other activities. In most cases, the difficulty associated with lack of resources 
and the lack of industry- specific guidance documents, training, and hazards information leads to 
either compliance or process deficiencies. The question on the table, is what are the primary 
basic essential components of a Safety and Management Program that are essential, at a 




      
 
      
 
Primary basic essential components do not necessarily apply only if we refer to figure 2 and all 
the elements within. There are those elements that are secondary. Now, one may even suggest 
that there are other primary elements such as contractor management, emergency response or 
auditing. This presenter is suggesting that for small or mid-sized non-PSM facilities or non-
Chemical facilities, the four fundamental pillars plus the five essential process safety elements 
are the minimum basis for a healthy Process Safety Management program. For instance, one 
cannot have an emergency response program until you have identified all the risks first (Hazard, 
Evaluation, Recognition & control). One cannot have an auditing program until the operating 


























Change Management System: 
    
Process or Facility Change Possible Impact 
 
Building addition 
Choice of insulation material may change 
combustibility of building 
Building renovation Existing fire divisions may be compromised 
 
Installing new equipment 
Increase of fire/explosion hazard; existing fire 
protection systems may not be designed for this type 
of hazard 
 
Storing new product in distribution warehouse 
Existing fire protection systems may not be designed 
for this new commodity 
 
Change of packaging material or type of pallet 
used 
Possible change of commodity classification of the 
stored goods, resulting in inadequate fire protection 
systems 
 
New raw material 
Different fire and explosion behavior, such as 
combustible dusts, flammable liquids, thermally 
unstable materials, incompatibility of materials, etc. 
Change of supplier Dependency on single source supplier 
Employee attrition Loss of vital experience in a team 
  
The concept of change management (in the sense of maintaining plant safety when 
changes occur) has been a critical part of the risk management philosophy in the petroleum, 
chemical and nuclear power industries for decades due to the severe hazards present [15]. 
However, property losses are not limited to these industries and the non-chemical industry is 
equally challenged to safely manage changes (i.e. recent Dust Explosion Incidents). A 
management of change systems helps to ensure that hazards associated with a change are 
identified and controlled. Where changes are undertaken in an unstructured way, new hazards 
may not be recognized and the increase in risk unnoticed. Hazards and risk can relate to assets 
and to an increased potential for an interruption to operation continuity. [15] [17] 
 
First, to manage proposed changes, a systematic procedure should be established and 
implemented. Second, ensure that this system is structured to identify changes before they are 
implemented. It is also important that this system determines if the planned change is a 
significant change, which needs to be carefully evaluated and managed, or a minor change, that 
has no further impact on a site’s overall loss control /safety concept. [15] [17] 
 
 
Figure 3: Examples of Possible changes requiring change management in a large or small facility 
Mechanical Integrity: 
Mechanical Integrity is an essential element of an efficient process and a safe, cost-
effective facility. Furthermore, OSHA’s PSM Standard (29 CFR 1910.119[j]) requires it. 
However, for decades Mechanical Integrity has been a leading cause of OSHA citations. One of 
the single biggest misconceptions is that it only applies to major chemical facilities. The second 
misconception is that it only applies to the act of preventative maintenance. It also applies to the 
network of people and record-keeping practices that support maintenance programs large or 
small. MI activities encompass the entire lifecycle of the covered equipment, including 
engineering, construction and spare parts, not just the ongoing maintenance activities. [10] [14] 
[7][8] 
 
RAGAGEP: Applies to Big and Small; chemical and non-chemical 
The PSM standard does not define RAGAGEP, even though it uses or implies the term in three 
places within the OSHA PSM Standard. Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering 
Practices (RAGAGEP) are specifically referenced standards that serve as the basis for 
engineering, operation, or maintenance activities and are themselves based on established codes, 
standards, published technical reports, or recommended practices or similar documents. 
RAGAGEP detail generally approved ways to perform specific engineering, inspection, or 
mechanical integrity activities, such as fabricating a vessel, inspecting a storage tank, or 
servicing a relief valve.” It is more important to understand where, and how, RAGAGEP applies, 
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Figure 4: Examples of RAGAGEP for Equipment [7][8] [10] [11] 
Operating Procedures and Instructions: 
Operating procedures go together with process safety information. It is important for 
individuals from any organization to have a clear understanding of the process in all modes of 
operation (i.e. startup, shutdown, normal) In so many times or instances there are audit findings 
or incidents where deficiencies point to incorrect or updated information in operating procedures 
or there are no procedures for all modes of operation. For instance, companies may have good 
procedures for operating within safe limits, but as soon as the process begins to deviate, there is 
often inadequate guidance on what steps are to be taken by the individuals in this mode of 
operation. An additional and modern-day challenge posed by increasing operational complexity, 
increasing retirement group and a shortage of skilled labor must be approached in a structured 
way to make small and mid-sized process plants more efficient and safe. Incorrect or outdated 
procedures—or even a poor understanding of operating procedures—can lead to incidents 
resulting in fatality, equipment damage, production loss, poor public image, and litigation. [19] 
[1] 
Procedural operations are effective when they are: easy to understand, revised regularly, 
with proper management of change, encompass accurate process information (PSI) and are 
quickly accessible when needed. The time spent in investing in operating procedures can be 
justified most often through reduced downtime, consistency and higher production yields. [19] 
[1] 
 
Hazard Recognition, Evaluation and Control (Hazard Analysis): 
This element is key and core to any health and safety program. When asked, most people 
would quickly conclude that this is the crux of a process safety program. It is a term that is 
comprehensive, subjective, qualitative and quantitative. It encompasses all activities involved in 
identifying hazards and evaluating risks at facilities, throughout their life cycle, to make certain 
that risks to employees, the public, or the environment are consistently controlled within the 
organization’s risk tolerance. [1] This involves proactive hazard recognition in terms of 
environment (the surroundings of the workers), the people doing the work, equipment/materials 
used in the work process, and processes/practices themselves. A formal “Job Hazard Analysis”, 
“Job Safety Analysis” or “Process Hazard Analysis” assists with the process and is an integral 
basis to many of the other elements listed in Figure 2. Once hazards have been identified and 
prioritized, they must be controlled. The generally industry accepted hierarchy of controls is 
elimination/substitution, engineering controls, administrative controls and personal protective 
equipment. The earlier in the life cycle that effective risk analysis is performed, the more cost 
effective the future safe operation of the process or activity is likely to be. [1]  
Training and Education:  
Having a training system in place for new and current employees is imperative and crucial in any 
facility. The training is about the ‘What’ and ‘How’ in any organization and the education is 
about the ‘Why’. Both training and education are not mutually exclusive and they are equally as 
important. This includes permanent, temporary and even contracted employees. However, this 
element is as much about continuous communication and total understanding of Processes or 
Equipment Knowledge as it is about simple training and education especially in this current 
environment of a reduced skilled labor pool. It is extremely important that the inherent technical 
and operational knowledge of any organization, including its hazards, design and operational 
know-how, must be retained and continuously passed on to new technicians, operators, and/or 












       
 
As mentioned earlier, the reduced volume of people in a small to mid-sized non-chemical and/or 
non-PSM Facility contributes to the difficulty of implementing an effective process safety 
program. In most cases, the difficulty is associated with lack of resources and the lack of 
industry-chemical specific guidance documents, training, and hazard information.  The term 
‘PSM Lite’ is used to characterize those primary essential elements, as identified in Figure 1 and 
explicitly outlined in the OSHA PSM standard, that are essential for the efficiency and success of 
any organization but allow small and mid-sized companies and facilities to customize a program 
that is not a burden for the organization to maintain yet set the organization up for Process Safety 
Success.  
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